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Nosce Te Ipsum: 
The Senses of Self-Knowledge in Early Modern England 
Elizabeth L. Swann1 
 
I. Scepticism and Self-Knowledge 
We are difficult. Human beings are difficult. We’re difficult to ourselves, we’re difficult to each 
other. And we are mysteries to ourselves, we are mysteries to each other. One encounters in 
any ordinary day far more real difficulty than one confronts in the most “intellectual” piece of 
work. Why is it believed that poetry, prose, painting, music should be less than we are?2 
With these words, part of an interview published in the Paris Review in 2000, Geoffrey Hill responds 
to the interviewer’s comment that his poetry is often thought to be inaccessible by presenting this 
abstruseness as a natural and appropriate response to the challenges of understanding humanity itself.  
In particular, Hill touches on two themes which, this essay argues, were of profound concern to writers 
and theologians in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: the opacity of the self to the 
self, and the capacity of poetics to explore this mystery.  
In the Western world, philosophy has long been conceived of as a discipline of self-knowledge, 
and the Socratic, ethical, and spiritual imperative to ‘know thyself’ was frequently reiterated in the early 
modern period. Nonetheless, thinkers from across the confessional spectrum frequently emphasized 
the difficulties (and sometimes even the impossibility) of achieving self-knowledge. ‘Thou art to 
narrow, wretch’, Donne informs his soul in The Second Anniversary (1612), ‘to comprehend / Euen thy 
self’.3 This notion that self-knowledge is – counter-intuitively – the most difficult form of knowledge 
owed something to two related phenomena which emerged around the middle of the sixteenth 
century: the development of the anthropological assumptions of Reformed theology, and the revival 
of classical scepticism. Montaigne’s long essay ‘An Apologie of Raymond Sebond’, first published in 
the 1580 edition of his Essays, and translated into English by John Florio in 1603, is seminal here.4 An 
                                                          
1 Research leading to this essay received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s 
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement no 617849. Many thanks to Shani Bans, Joan 
Pong Linton, Rachel Willie, and the editors of this volume for helpful comments on drafts of this essay.  
2 ‘The Art of Poetry LXXX: Geoffrey Hill', an interview with Carl Phillips, p. 275.  
3 Donne, ‘The Second Anniuersarie’, G1r. 
4 On Montaigne’s transformation of ‘the Socratic tradition of philosophy as self-knowledge', see Ann Hartle, 'The Essay 
as Self-Knowledge’, pp. 63-83.  
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influential strand in Montaigne criticism suggests that, for Montaigne, self-knowledge is the last 
bastion of certainty. For Erich Auerbach, the Essays ‘reveal Montaigne’s conviction that no branch of 
learning and no form of knowledge could possibly be acquired with as much exactness and 
comprehensiveness as self-knowledge’.5 And indeed, at points in the Essays, Montaigne does make 
claims about the special status of the self as an object of knowledge. In ‘Of Repenting’, for example, 
Montaigne writes of himself that ‘never man handled subject, he vnderstood or knew, better then I 
doe this I have vndertaken’.6   
Elsewhere, however, Montaigne is considerably less confident about the attainability of self-
knowledge.7 In the ‘Apologie’, self-knowledge poses a particular challenge precisely because of what 
might initially seem to be an epistemic advantage: that is, the proximity of the self to the self. ‘Our 
condition beareth’, Montaigne suggests, ‘that the knowledge of what we touch with our hands, and 
have amongst vs, is as far from vs and above the clouds, as that of the stars’ – and the self is no 
exception. Querying the arrogance of Sebond’s detractors, Montaigne asks: ‘Did they never sound 
amid their books the difficulties that present themselves to them, to know their owne being?’8 ‘It is 
likely’, he elaborates, ‘that if the soule knew any thing, she first knew her selfe’. And yet: 
Even at this day the Gods of Physicke are seene to wrangle about our Anatomie… When shall 
we expect that they will be agreed? We are neerer vnto our selves, then is whitenesse vnto 
snow, or weight vnto a stone. If man know not himselfe, how can he know his functions and forces?9  
This passage requires some explanation: Montaigne’s comment about the whiteness of snow recalls 
an earlier reference to the pre-Socratic philosopher Anaxagoras, who had argued, counter-intuitively, 
that snow is not white but black – a piece of sophistry that Pyrrhonian sceptics took to indicate the 
controvertibility of all knowledge.10 On the other hand, academic sceptics (who took doubt as a 
heuristic tool for uncovering probabilistic, if not certain, knowledge) found this risible: for them, we 
can be reasonably sure about proximate phenomena such as the whiteness of snow, or the weight of 
                                                          
5 Auerbach, ‘L’Humaine Condition’, p. 301. 
6 Michel de Montaigne, ‘Of Repenting’, Ss4r. 
7 As Luiz Eva argues, pace Auerbach, ‘instead of helping to achieve knowledge of the self, [Montaigne’s essays] should be 
taken… as exhibiting how he fails to gain self-knowledge’: ‘Scepticism and Self-Knowledge’, p. 73. 
8 Montaigne, ‘An Apologie of Raymond Sebond’, Dd1v. 
9 Montaigne, ‘Apologie’, Ee2r-v. 
10 See Cicero, Academica, trans. Rackham, II.XXIII.72 and II.XXXI.100-101. Montaigne writes, ‘humane reason hath 
perswaded, that she had neither ground nor footing, no not so much as to warrant snow to be white: And Anaxagoras said, 
it was blacke’. ‘Apologie’, Cc3v. 
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a stone which we toss in our hand. It is Montaigne’s sense of the limits of self-knowledge that leads 
him to affirm ‘the Pyrrhonians advise’ as ‘more likely’.11 Indeed, it is precisely our closeness to our own 
selves that makes self-knowledge so challenging to achieve. Florio’s translation preserves the 
ambiguity of Montaigne’s original French nicely: ‘we are neerer vnto our selves, then is whitenesse 
vnto snow, or weight vnto a stone’ (‘nous nous sommes plus voisins, que ne nous est la blancheur de la neige, ou 
la pesanteur de la pierre’).12 Montaigne’s most widely-consulted modern translators, M. A. Screech and 
Donald Frame,  both take Montaigne to mean, as Frame puts it, that ‘we are nearer to ourselves than 
the whiteness of snow or the weight of stone are to us’.13 For Florio, however, we are closer to 
ourselves than whiteness is close to snow, or weight is close to stones. There is a gap, however 
negligible, between the sensory properties of an object, and the essence of the object: snow is not its 
whiteness, and a stone is not its weight. But we are ourselves. It is for this reason that self-knowledge 
is impossible: we cannot grasp what we are.  
II. Augustine and Reformed Theology 
The sceptical uncertainty about self-knowledge is echoed in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Reformed theology. Here, the stakes are high: self-knowledge was considered a religious obligation. 
Although the command nosce te ipsum, which was inscribed on the forecourt of the Temple of Apollo 
at Delphi, had pagan associations, its ultimate origins were often conceived as heavenly: in the words 
of Thomas Elyot in The boke named the Gouernour (1537), ‘were it Apollo, that spake it […] suerly it 
proceded of god’.14 Indeed, for many the quest for self-knowledge was coterminous with the quest for 
God. Here the influence of St Augustine was considerable. In the Confessions, alienation from the self 
(engendered by sin) is indistinguishable from alienation from God. ‘Where was I’, Augustine asks God, 
regarding his pre-conversion self, ‘when I sought after thee? Thou wert directly before mee, but I had 
gone backe from thee; nor did I then finde my selfe, much lesse thee’. Augustine frequently expresses 
bewilderment about his own nature, thoughts, and impulses, even going so far as to qualify scripture 
                                                          
11 Although there may be an intentional irony in Montaigne’s use of probabilistic language (‘more likely’) to undercut 
Academic probabilism.  
12 Montaigne, Les Essais, p. 561. 
13 Montaigne, ‘Apologie’, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Frame, p. 421. The translations by Frame and Screech are 
both based on the Bordeaux copy of the Essais, whereas Florio used the 1595 edition by Marie de Gournay. See Mack, 
‘Montaigne and Florio’, pp. 78-79. 
14 Elyot, The boke named the Gouernour, X2r (164). On the oracle’s pagan and diabolical associations, see Parke and Wormell, 
The Delphic Oracle, 389, and Ossa-Richardson, The Devil's Tabernacle. 
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in order to make his point. Citing 1 Corinthians 2:11 (‘no man knows the being of man except the 
spirit of man which is in him’), he adds ‘Yet is there some thing of man, which the very spirit of man 
that is in him, knoweth not’. Subsequently, conversion is simultaneously an entry into a more perfect 
relationship with the divine, and the dawning of deeper self-understanding: ‘now was the day come’, 
writes Augustine, anticipating his imminent conversion experience in Book VIII, ‘wherein I was to 
bee set naked before my selfe’.15  
 Reformers reiterate and develop the links that Augustine establishes between the search for 
self-knowledge and the search for God. As John Calvin writes in the first chapter of The Institution of 
Christian Religion, translated by Thomas Norton in 1561: 
The whole summe… of all our wisedom… consisteth in two partes, that is to saye, the 
knowledge of God, and our selues… these two knowledges be with many brades linked 
together: yet whether goth before or engendreth the other, it is hard to discerne.  
For Calvin, self-knowledge and knowledge of God are isomorphic. On the one hand, by looking into 
ourselves and recognizing what Calvin describes as ‘our own ignoraunce, vanitie, beggery, weakenesse, 
peruersenesse, and corruption’, we come by comparison to appreciate the absolute purity and 
goodness of God.16  On the other hand, it is only through encountering the purity and goodness of 
God that we fully apprehend the extent of our own depravity.  
The urgent importance of self-knowledge for the devout, however, was balanced by a 
pervasive awareness of its challenges. Ironically, for many it is the Augustinian-cum-Calvinist 
conviction of humankind’s innate corruption and baseness – the primary focus of self-knowledge – 
that makes self-knowledge so difficult to achieve. Thus, for Donne, lack of self-understanding derives 
from a shame so profound that men hide from themselves. ‘The light of nature’, Donne informs his 
congregation in a 1621 sermon, ‘hath taught thee to hide thy sinnes from other men, and thou hast been 
so diligent in that, as that thou hast hid them from thy self, and canst not finde them’.17 On the Catholic 
continent, this notion was shared with the French Jansenists, who were committed to a ‘hyper-
                                                          
15 Augustine, Confessions, Book V, K10r (211); Book X, Cc2r-v; and Book VIII, V12v. 
16 Calvin, The Institution, A1r (fol. 1). 
17 Donne, ‘A Sermon Preached At the Earl of Bridgewaters house at the mariage of his daughter [1627]’, in Fifty sermons, 
Ff1v. 
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Augustinian’ anthropology and theology of grace.18 ‘Man without Grace’, as Pierre Nicole wrote in his 
Essais de morale (1671; trans. 1680), ‘is so great a punishment to himself, that he inclines continually to 
fly from himself… and that he thinks his happiness consists in being forgetful of himself’.19  
The theological acknowledgement of the challenges of self-knowledge, however, was also 
influenced by the revived interest in classical scepticism. Many Jansenists actively sympathized with 
Pyrrhonist authors, and Reformed thinkers, too, were far from immune to the provocations of 
sceptical philosophy: several echoed Montaigne in suggesting that an individual’s self-intimacy is a 
barrier to self-knowledge.20 In bringing skeptical thought to bear on their theological preoccupations, 
such thinkers confronted and grappled with some inherent ambiguities in Augustinian thought for 
ends which were pastoral and practical, as well as polemical. 
Whilst Augustine of the Confessions describes his personal quest for self-knowledge as 
protracted and arduous, his most explicit and systematized comments on self-knowledge occur in On 
the Trinity, where we find a very different story.21 In this later tract, Augustine subscribes to a version 
of what would later be referred to by philosophers as ‘the doctrine of privileged access’, namely, the 
notion that an individual’s introspective judgements about his or her mental states are not subject to 
error in the same way as judgments about external things.22 Augustine starts from the principle that it 
is the nature of the mind to know things. As an entity which is defined by its capacity to know, the 
mind must necessary know itself, for ‘what is so present to knowledge as that which is present to the 
mind? Or what is so present to the mind as itself?’ Even the desire to know one’s own mind is evidence 
that the mind already knows itself: ‘when it seeks to know itself, it already knows that it is seeking 
itself. Therefore, it already knows itself’. Consequently, for Augustine ‘every mind knows and is certain 
concerning itself’.23  
                                                          
18 Jansenist thinking on this subject is treated by Michael Moriarty in Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves (see especially pp. 305-315). 
Moriarty also explores suspicion of the transparency of experience (including self-experience) in his earlier Early Modern 
French Thought. On ‘hyper-Augustinianism’ – a radical interpretation of grace as a necessary obliteration of the depraved 
human will – see Taylor, Sources of the Self, especially pp. 246-47, 332-34. 
19 Nicole, Moral Essays, B2v.  
20 On the connections between scepticism and Jansenism, see Lennon, ‘Jansenism and the Crise Pyrrhonienne’.  
21 For a cogent account of self-knowledge in On the Trinity, see Brittain, ‘Self-Knowledge in Cicero and Augustine’, 119-
136. 
22 On the doctrine of privileged access, see Cassam, ‘Contemporary Reactions’, p. 483. See also Matthews, ‘Introduction’, 
p. xxv. 
23 Augustine, On the Trinity, pp. 48-55.  
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Crucially, one of the main ways in which Augustine explains this principle is by referring to, 
and ultimately rejecting, an analogy that originated with the neo-Platonic philosopher Porphyry: 
namely, the suggestion that our inability to know ourselves is like the inability of the eye to see itself.24 
Augustine denies this analogy in favour of an emphasis on the feasibility and ease of self-knowledge, 
and on the incorporeity of the soul:  
Not as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself, so does the mind know 
other minds and does not know itself. […] For eyes will never see themselves except in a 
mirror; nor are we to believe in any way that such means may also be used for the 
contemplation of incorporeal things, as that the mind should know itself as it were in a 
mirror.25 
For Augustine, it is the corporeality of the eye which prevents it from perceiving itself, except by 
means of the material, indirect aid of a mirror. Such a mode of knowledge is not appropriate for the 
incorporeal soul, which (as Augustine has already demonstrated to his own satisfaction) is possessed 
of an immediate and assured form of self-knowledge. It is remarkable, then, that when early modern 
theologians and authors invoke the eye analogy – as they frequently do – it is levied in support of 
exactly the sceptical argument that Augustine denies: that the soul is ultimately inscrutable to itself, 
and that access to it must be mediated and incomplete. In the words of the nonconformist minister 
and physician Richard Gilpin in A treatise of Satan’s temptations (1677), ‘some things are dark and 
uncertain to us, from their very proximity to us […] such are the nature, faculties, and workings of our 
own Souls within us: which we cannot directly see, (as the Eyes sees not it self) and do but as it were 
guess by dark reflections’.26 
As Richard Popkin and others have suggested, the revival of classical scepticism combined 
with Reformation and counter-Reformation thought to unsettle long-standing certainties.27 Late 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century practical theologians, however, also made use of sceptical 
philosophy – including the notion of the unknowable self – not to disturb or disrupt accepted dogmas, 
                                                          
24 See Porphyre [Porphyry], Sentences, nos. 43, 830-32. The analogy was elaborated by Cicero before it was adopted by 
Augustine:  ‘the soul has not the power of itself to see itself, but, like the eye, the soul, though it does not see itself, yet 
discerns other things.’ Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, p. 79. 
25 Augustine, On the Trinity, pp. 27, 47.  
26 Gilpin, Demonologia sacra, Dd3v. For an earlier iteration, see Phillipe de Mornay: ‘notwithstanding how lyuely and 
quickesighted so euer the eye be; it séeth not it self. Woonder not therefore though thou haue a soule […] that the same 
soule sée not it self’. Mornay, The trewnesse of the Christian religion, Q4v. 
27 Popkin, History of Scepticism. 
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but rather to offer practical, pastoral guidance and support. There is a broad scholarly consensus that 
the Calvinist doctrine of predestination encouraged intense self-scrutiny, as believers examined 
themselves and their lives for signs of election and grace. For some, such self-scrutiny resulted in a 
complacent (and therefore dangerous) sense of ‘security’ about their own salvation.28 Others found 
themselves wanting, producing intense anxiety and desolation. Working within this framework, 
Reformed theologians make use of the suggestion that full self-knowledge is a futile aspiration both 
to obviate the conviction of the over-confident of their own salvation, and to palliate anxieties in those 
who feared their own lack of grace. 
The moderate Puritan Richard Greenham, writing in a 1595 treatise intended to offer ‘sweet 
Comfort for an afflicted Conscience’, is a case in point. In offering reassurance to those distressed by 
their own sinful natures, Greenham observes that their distress is itself a form of humility, and as such 
one sign of salvation. Conversely, the truly degenerate tend to take their own virtuous actions as a sure 
sign of election. Such complacency, Greenham warns, is misguided, for ‘the hidden corruption of our 
nature, may threaten some haynous downefall in time to come’. This is because we cannot know our 
future selves: ‘though we may remember what we have been […] yet who can tell what may come 
unto him hereafter’.29 Greenham encourages early modern men and women to see their own selves as 
enigmas, full of moral and spiritual peril; and for those who already recognize themselves as such, he 
offers reassurance that this need not indicate a lack of grace. Richard Hooker also makes use of the 
notion of humankind’s self-ignorance in order to alleviate the fear and despair with which many 
responded to Calvinist predestination. As he contends in his 1612 sermon ‘of the certaintie and 
perpetuitie of faith in the elect’, an over-scrupulous anxiety about whether or not one is saved can 
obscure the evidence of blessedness in oneself: 
Men […] are through extremitie of griefe many times in judgement so confounded, that they 
finde not themselves in themselves. For that which dwelleth in their harts they seeke […]. It 
abideth, it worketh in them, yet still they aske where? Still they lament… as if they did not 
believe when they do; & as if they did dispaire when they do not. […] Our faith may have and 
hath her privie operations secret to us, in whom […] they are.30 
                                                          
28 Susan Schreiner takes what she calls ‘the passion for certainty’ as a central stimulus of religious controversy in the 
sixteenth century, perhaps underestimating the extent to which reformers and counter-reformers alike were prepared to 
accommodate doubt and uncertainty: Are You Alone Wise?, especially chapter 2. On the pejorative associations of ‘securitas’ 
for Luther, see Giles Waller’s chapter in this volume. 
29 Greenham, A most sweete and assured comfort, D8v and D11r-v. 
30 Hooker, A learned and comfortable sermon, B1r, B2r. 
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For Hooker, it is possible to be so caught up in a fretful search for signs of one’s election that one can 
be saved and yet not realise it, precisely because one is distracted by that search. Here, the opacity of 
the self is a bulwark against the sin of despair, for if you can never be absolutely certain that you are 
saved, so too can you never be absolutely certain that you are damned. For both Greenham and 
Hooker, in different ways, a sceptical idea serves not to unsettle religious certainties, but to serve the 
practical, pastoral ends of Reformed theology, whether by encouraging vigilance or offering comfort. 
III. Body and soul  
So far in this essay, I have been primarily taking self-knowledge as a moral and spiritual quest. For 
Augustine, the feasibility of self-knowledge depends on understanding the self as coterminous with 
the mind or soul. In this, he concurs with a number of ancient authorities, including Cicero in Tusculan 
Disputations. ‘I do not suppose’, Cicero comments, ‘the meaning of the maxim is that we should know 
our limbs, our height or shape; our selves are not bodies […]. When then Apollo says, “Know thyself,” 
he says, “Know thy soul.”’31 As Angus Gowland has recently argued, the mind-body dualism of Cicero 
and Augustine endured well into the seventeenth century: for early modern men and women, Gowland 
contends, ‘the “true”, “inner” self of the individual human being was the rational soul’. 32 This claim, 
however, goes against the grain of the dominant model of subjectivity within early modern studies in 
recent decades, according to which there was, in Gail Kern Paster’s words, ‘no way conceptually or 
discursively to separate the psychological from the physiological’.33 Drawing on Galenic medical 
theory, scholars such as Paster have insisted that early modern selves were fundamentally embodied. 
In fact, the question of whether the self should be understood primarily as a spiritual or as a 
physical entity was a live issue in the early modern period itself. Although writers in the Reformed 
tradition, including Greenham and Hooker, clearly associated self-knowledge with knowledge of one’s 
spiritual state, they also described processes of soul-searching in intensely visceral terms.34 Greenham, 
for example, calls the guilty conscience a ‘wound’ which must be ‘prick[ed] and ‘pierce[d]’ by ‘the 
burning iron of the Law’.35 Similarly, for the physician and anatomist Helkiah Crooke – who edited 
                                                          
31 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 62-3. 
32 Gowland, ‘Melancholy, Passions, and Identity’, 86.  
33  Paster, Humouring the Body, 12. In addition to Gowland, other recent critiques of humoural psychology include Mullaney, 
The Reformation of the Emotions, pp. 54-60, and Meek and Sullivan, ‘Introduction’. 
34 On embodied self-scrutiny, see Sawday, ‘Self and Selfhood’. 
35 Greenham, A most sweete and assured comfort, D2v.  
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Greenham’s treatise in 1598 – anatomical expertise offered one route to self-knowledge, allowing 
some of the spiritual anguish and uncertainty identified by Greenham to be overcome.36 ‘Anatomy’, 
Crooke proclaims in his Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man (1615), ‘is […] a most 
certaine and sure guide to the admirable and most excellent knowledge of our selves’.37  
Early modern authors, then, frequently describe the pursuit of self-knowledge in corporeal 
terms: the body is not a barrier to self-understanding, as it was for Augustine, but a route to it. This 
emphasis on embodiment, however, is not necessarily incompatible with a dualistic notion of the self 
as primarily spiritual. Early modern selves were deeply embodied, but we need to cast the net wider in 
order to understand what embodiment meant in this period, and how it was imbricated with spiritual 
and mental processes. In particular, the polarization of recent debate around two supposedly mutually-
exclusive models of selfhood – physical versus spiritual – derives from the critical obsession with the 
pneumatic and hydraulic model of embodiment offered by Galenic medicine. This has obscured an 
alternative early modern understanding of embodiment in terms of sensation. In this rather different 
interpretation, the embodied self is constituted through sensory processes which bridge the gap 
between the physical, and the mental or spiritual realms. 38 Consequently, self-knowledge is predicated 
on reflexive, sensory self-attentiveness. Thus, in Of Wisdom (trans. 1608), Pierre Charron advises his 
readers that: 
The knowledge of a mans selfe is [acquired] […] by a true, long, and daily study of himselfe 
[…] of his most secret thoughts […] and whatsoeuer is in him, euen his nightly dreames, 
prying narrowly into him, trying him often and at all howres, pressing and pinching him euen 
to the quicke […] taking him in all senses, beholding him with all visages, feeling his poulse, 
sounding him to to the quicke, entring into him with a candle and a snuffer, searching and 
creeping into euery hole, corner, turning, closet, and secret place.39  
Here, the attempt to achieve self-knowledge is intensely sensory, a matter of ‘beholding’, ‘feeling’, and 
‘sounding’. As such, it is also profoundly embodied, revealing its secrets partly through medical-
diagnostic procedures such as pulse-taking. This physical examination, however, does not exclude 
                                                          
36 Birken, ‘Crooke, Helkiah’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
37 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, C1r-v. As David Hillman notes, ‘Crooke’s rhetoric […] conflates an objective knowledge of 
the human body with an understanding of subjective human nature’: Shakespeare’s Entrails, p. 34. 
38 As Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman suggest, embodiment might productively be treated as ‘a constellation of 
different kinds of sensory and perceptual engagement with the world’: ‘Introduction’, p. 3. 
39 Charron, Of wisdom, B3v. 
10 
 
investigation of more intangible ‘secret thoughts’ and ‘nightly dreams’: it is psychological as well as 
physiological, intellective as well as physical. For Charron and many of his contemporaries, self-
knowledge is not a matter of attending to the ebb and flow of the humours, but rather of engaging 
the senses.  
More specifically, the self was not only a sensory entity, but one which was often understood 
in terms of Aristotelian ideas about perception. Briefly, according to Aristotle and his scholastic 
commentators, there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses.40 Sensation itself occurs 
when sensory ‘species’, incorporeal emanations from material things, imprint the form or image of the 
object of perception on the subject’s sensory organs. As Aristotle puts it in De Anima, ‘the sense is the 
recipient of the perceived forms without their matter’.41 The sensory species or impressions are then 
transported by means of the ‘vital’ or ‘animal spirits’ from the sense organs to the brain, where an 
‘inner’ sense known as the common sense worked to aggregate and reflect on the data received, 
synthesising it into a coherent perceptual whole.42 From here, sense impressions could be stored in 
the memory, judged by reason, or recombined and recreated by the imagination or phantasy. 
This notion that sensation occurs via a literal imprinting of the form or image of the object of 
perception on the subject’s perceptual organs gave sense experience a key role in shaping the self, 
understood as a hylomorphic compound of form and matter, or body and soul. Sensation is described 
as a kind of alteration: the sensing individual is, at least in part, remade in the image of the world that 
he or she perceives. And because the process of sensing is also, in Aristotelian epistemology, a process 
of acquiring knowledge, knowing has a part to play in the formation of the self. As the devotional 
writer and Bishop of Norwich, Edward Reynolds, put it in Meditations on the fall and rising of St Peter 
(1677): 
All knowledg consists in mixture and union, whereby the understanding receiveth into it the 
image and similitude of the thing which it knows; which made the Philosopher [Aristotle] say, 
That the Soul in understanding a thing is made the very thing which it understands.43 
                                                          
40 The phrase ‘nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu’ is actually of indeterminate origin, but was often attributed to 
Aristotle in the early modern period. See Cranefield, ‘On the Origins of the Phrase’. 
41 Aristotle, De Anima, p. 187. 
42 For a cogent account of Aristotle’s ideas about the common sense, see Roazen, The Inner Touch, p. 38. 
43 Reynolds, Meditations, E4v-E5r. 
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Sensory experience is thus a process of transformation. Sensing is not just something which an 
individual self does; it actively contributes to the formation of the self. Put another way, the 
accumulation of sensory information is also a process of in-formation, of being formed, moulded, 
shaped, or fashioned.44 This moulding or shaping, moreover, traverses the boundary between body 
and spirit, as physical experience culminates in the transformation of the soul. The sensory language 
used to describe processes of self-knowledge, then, associates the self neither with the physical 
specificities of humoural complexion, nor with incorporeal spirit. Instead, the self emerges in a 
transaction between body and soul or mind, as the individual strives to gain understanding of the 
world through the senses. 
IV. Sensory Metaphor and Literary Form 
The remainder of this essay takes Sir John Davies’ Nosce Teipsum – a fascinating and critically under-
appreciated gallimaufry of neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, and patristic (especially Augustinian) doctrine, 
with debts to Montaigne – as a sustained and profound meditation on the ways in which poetic 
language can both explicate and evade the challenges of embodied self-knowledge.45 In Davies’ poem, 
physical metaphors and analogies are instrumental in cultivating a form of knowledge about the soul 
which is defined, paradoxically, by the limits of such knowledge – as with Greenham’s insistence that 
uncertainty about one’s salvation is a clear indication of the presence of grace. In the words of Pierre 
Nicole, ‘it is […] one part of the Knowledge we may have of our selves, to comprehend that we do 
not know our selves with assurance, in what even appears most Essential’.46 Acknowledging the 
inscrutability of the soul is therefore a form of knowledge about the soul (specifically, about its innate 
limitations). We have already seen hints of this in what I have called the eye analogy. When Gilpin 
compares the soul to the eye which ‘sees not it self’ because of its ‘very proximity to us’, and suggests 
that the only way to gain knowledge of the soul is through ‘dark reflections’, he is using a sensory analogy 
to explain the unknowability of the soul, to make it comprehensible. In this way, the analogy itself 
functions as something like one of the ‘dark reflections’ by which it is possible to reach some kind of 
understanding of what we are. In asserting the unknowability of the soul, the eye analogy actually 
                                                          
44 The etymon is the classical Latin informāre: to give form to, shape, fashion, to describe, to form in the mind, to form an 
idea of, to mould. ‘Information, n.’ OED Online, accessed 15 July 2016. oed.com/view/Entry/95568.  
45 On the poem’s indebtedness to Montaigne, see Nemser, ‘Nosce Teipsum and the Essais of Montaigne’, 95-103. 
46 Nicole, Moral essays, F11v. 
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makes visible the limits of human self-knowledge: it functions as a means of expressing, and thereby 
knowing, our own ignorance.  
Nosce Teipsum again explores the fertile tensions within Augustine’s thinking on this subject. 
Davies affirms that knowledge of the soul is possible for human beings, yet he places a pronounced 
emphasis on its limitations.47 Like Augustine, the knowledge that he is especially concerned to avow 
(against the recent revival of Epicurean atomism) is of the immateriality and immortality of the soul, 
which emphatically does not ‘spring […] from the Bodies humors’.48 Davies departs dramatically from 
Augustine, however, in the method that he uses to ‘prove’ both that knowledge of the soul is achievable, 
and that such knowledge ultimately consists of a recognition of the soul’s incorporeity and 
immortality. In On the Trinity, Augustine instructs that ‘When [the mind] is […] commanded to know 
itself, it should not seek itself as though it were to be withdrawn from itself, but it should rather 
withdraw what it has added to itself’.49 Self-knowledge is a matter of stripping back the material 
accretions which have attached themselves to our conception of our own minds, in order to reveal 
the true knowledge which was there all along. For all the Platonic and Augustinian framework of his 
poem, Davies utterly disregards these directives. Instead, he makes heavy use of physical and sensory 
analogies and metaphors, both in order to cultivate self-knowledge and to articulate its limits.  
Early on in the poem, Davies highlights the elusiveness of self-knowledge. ‘All things without, 
which round about we see’, Davies comments, ‘we seeke to know […] but that whereby we reason, 
live, and be, / Within our selves, we strangers are thereto’. Asking why this is the case, Davies follows 
Augustine in trying out, and then rejecting, the eye analogy:  
Is it because the minde is like the eye […]  
Not seeing it selfe, when other things it sees? 
No doubtless, for the minde can backward cast 
Vpon her selfe, her vnderstanding light; 
But she is so corrupt, and so defac’t, 
As her own image doth her selfe affright. 
                                                          
47 Eric Langley similarly notes Davies’ concern with the limits of self-knowledge, although he is more concerned with the 
ethics of self-knowledge than with its epistemology, and reads the poem as a conventional statement of the limitations 
which the flesh places on the body: Narcissism and Suicide, pp. 43-4, 49-50. 
48 Davies, Nosce teipsum, C3r. 
49 Augustine, On the Trinity, p. 53. 
13 
 
Reiterating Augustine’s argument that the soul can achieve self-illumination, Davies explains the fact 
that people are nonetheless frequently deceived about themselves by reference to the Augustinian-
Calvinist argument that we shy away from confronting our own depravity. The means which Davies 
offers for correcting this tendency, however, differs radically from that offered by Augustine:  
[…] who so makes a mirror of his mind, 
And doth with patience view himselfe therein, 
His Soules eternitie shall clearly find,  
Though th’other beauties be defac’t with sinne.50 
 
Whilst On the Trinity strenuously denies that the immaterial mind can see itself as the physical eyes do, 
‘in a mirror’, Davies suggests that the soul’s immortality can be perceived in exactly this way. What, 
though, does it mean to make a mirror of one’s mind? Whilst Davies does not elaborate, the 
implication is that Nosce Teipsum itself performs this reflective role: by picturing the soul, it offers it 
access to itself.51 The Church of England clergyman William Sherlock’s definition of self-knowledge 
of 1694 is helpful here: ‘self-knowledge properly signifies to contemplate our own Natures in their 
Idea, to draw our own Image and Picture as like the Original as we can, and to view our selves in it’.52 
Sherlock suggests that the first stage of self-knowledge is self-representation. This is exactly what 
Davies’ poem performs. Thus, in an invocation to God-as-Muse, the first glimmerings of self-
understanding converge with the present-tense inception of the poem: ‘O Light which mak’st the 
Light’, Davies beseeches, ‘Lighten my spirit with one cleere heavenly ray, / Which now to view it selfe 
doth first begin’. Soon after, he implies that his petition has been answered: ‘now, me thinks, I do 
distinguish plaine/ Each subtill line of her [i.e. the soul’s] immortall face’. In both cases, the deictic 
‘now’ aligns the dawning of self-knowledge with the moment of writing.  In an understated pun, the 
lines of the poem are conflated with the lines of the soul’s face. Davies poeticizes the soul in order to 
discern it.  
Nosce Teipsum, then, does not retrospectively depict its speaker’s pursuit of self-knowledge; 
rather, the poem itself manifests and contributes to the cumulative development of that knowledge.53 
                                                          
50 Davies, Nosce teipsum, B2v, B3r, H4r. 
51 As Brian Cummings comments, ‘art or literature [is] intrinsically reflexive… the very act of writing involves reflecting 
upon the self’: Mortal Thoughts, p. 24.  
52 Sherlock, A defence, L3r. 
53 On the history of the idea that ‘reading and writing can play a fundamental role in the individual’s search for self-
knowledge and wisdom’, see Stock, ‘The Self and Literary Experience’.  
14 
 
Significantly, this knowledge is predicated on a mode of self-estrangement effected through the use 
of forms of metaphor, analogy, and personification: Davies can only see the soul once he has 
externalized it in his poem. Whilst Davies rejects the eye analogy, then, his poetic method implicitly 
affirms the notion it describes: the need for a measure of detachment from ourselves, in order to 
understand ourselves. As Davies puts it, in order ‘to judge herself’, the soul ‘must her selfe transcend 
/ As greater Circles comprehend the lesse’. One means by which this transcendence can occur is 
metaphor – especially, and paradoxically, through metaphors which figure the soul as a material entity. 
At different points in Nosce Teipsum, the soul is variously styled as a spreading vine, a bright star, a 
housewife and mother busily employed in ‘houshold things’, an industrious bee, ‘Noahs Doue’, an abject 
prisoner, and an imperious queen.54 All of these analogies are conventional enough, but the dense, 
sequential way that Davies amasses them, one after another, highlights their incompatibility – how can 
something be at once burgeoning vegetable matter and fixed celestial body, humble insect and haughty 
sovereign? – so that they simultaneously amplify and revise each other.  Davies rewrites the immaterial 
soul, the centre of the self, as a series of entities, recognizable in themselves but collectively 
disorienting. Self-knowledge is predicated on a re-presenting of the soul to itself as something which 
can be seen because it is made extraordinary, untethered by metaphor from its own illusory over-
familiarity.   
In Nosce Tepisum, formal literary features such as metaphor and analogy, periphrasis, 
apostrophe, and prosopopoeia serve to make the soul strange to itself, facilitating a form of self-
knowledge which simultaneously includes an inbuilt recognition of its own inadequacy. Thomas 
Browne’s comments in Religio Medici (1642) on the most appropriate form of language for expressing 
religious mysteries are illuminating here: 
Where there is an obscurity too deep for our reason, ’tis good to set downe with a description, 
periphrasis, or adumbration; for by acquainting our reason how unable it is to display the 
visible and obvious effect of nature, it becomes more humble and submissive unto the 
subtleties of faith.55 
For Browne, forms of language that we have come to think of as characterizing the ‘literary’ – 
description, periphrasis, and adumbration –  represent a way of ‘acquainting our reason’ with the 
inadequacy of reason. The indirections of such language register the limits of human ability to 
                                                          
54 Davies, Nosce teipsum, C1v, C2v-r, F4v-G1r, I1v-2r; C3v-4r. 
55 Browne, Religio Medici, A8v-B1r. 
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understand divine mysteries. In effect, complex or rhetorically elaborate language becomes a literary 
manifestation of the medieval via negativa, a way of describing the divine by describing what the divine 
is not (in the case of Davies: physical and material). For Davies, this kind of apophatic poetics provides 
a way to articulate the mysterious spark of divinity in the self.  
V. Conclusion 
For many men and women around the turn of the seventeenth century, the self – understood as a 
hylomorphic composite of body and mind, physical sensation and spiritual contemplation – was 
conceived of and experienced as inscrutable. This mysteriousness can be understood partly as a 
development of Calvinist anthropology: fearful of their spiritual fate, such men and women 
experienced their own souls as decimated by sin and oblivious to the seedlings of damnation or grace 
which kindled inside them. The elusiveness of the self, however, also had a philosophical and structural 
explanation, often articulated via the sensory analogy of the eye which cannot see itself. According to 
this strand of thought, the source of one’s self-alienation is, paradoxically, self-intimacy. The resources 
of poetry, I have suggested, offered one way out this conundrum. One paradox demands another: if 
we are estranged from ourselves through overfamiliarity, then we must become unfamiliar to ourselves 
in order to know ourselves. For John Davies, poetry functioned in just this way. By representing the 
soul in physical terms, poetic language could serve as a productive form of self-estrangement that could 
ultimately inculcate self-knowledge. Like one of Gilpin’s ‘dark reflections’, it was a shadowy and 
indirect means of encountering the enduring mystery that is the self.  
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